Beastly Contractarianism? A Contractarian Analysis of the Possibility of Animal Rights by Tucker, C. & MacDonald, C.
Essays in Philosophy
Volume 5
Issue 2 Animal Ethics Article 31
6-2004
Beastly Contractarianism? A Contractarian
Analysis of the Possibility of Animal Rights
C. Tucker
Saint Mary's University
C. MacDonald
Saint Mary's University
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Essays in Philosophy is a biannual journal published by Pacific University Library | ISSN 1526-0569 | http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/
Recommended Citation
Tucker, C. and MacDonald, C. (2004) "Beastly Contractarianism? A Contractarian Analysis of the Possibility of Animal Rights," Essays
in Philosophy: Vol. 5: Iss. 2, Article 31.
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/tucker.html[9/18/2009 5:10:11 PM]
Essays in Philosophy
A Biannual Journal
Vol. 5 No. 2, June 2004
Beastly Contractarianism?
A Contractarian Analysis of the Possibility of Animal Rights
Social Contract theorists and animal advocates seem to have agreed to go their separate ways.
Contractarians have avoided attempting to address an issue that seems destined to prove embarrassing for
the theory given the current political climate. It is largely thought that contractarianism affirms the
meager moral standing commonly attributed to most animals. In the face of this consensus, animal
advocates who feel the need to philosophically ground the moral status of animals have turned to other
potential sources. This is not a hard choice for animal advocates to make: utilitarianism is a respectable
moral theory that affords animals moral consideration with relative ease. Nevertheless, we argue that this
separation is a mistake. Contractarians can offer an account of the moral status of animals that is at least
as compelling as that offered by utilitarianism. Grounding the moral worth of animals in contract theory
also produces an importantly different account, one that can ground animal rights, as opposed to mere
considerability, which some animal advocates will find more appealing than the utilitarian alternative.
I. The Big Three
One of the well-established strengths of Utilitarianism is that it gives us good reason to conclude
that animals are worthy of moral consideration. The conclusion that animals, as beings that are
capable of experiencing pleasure and pain, are thus included in any justified utilitarian calculus
squares well with our intuition that animal cruelty is unjustified.1 But if the greater good is served
by sacrificing some animals for the purposes of research, then utilitarianism will recommend that
sacrifice (or the rule that allows sacrifice in those situations). Peter Singer, in his book Animal
Liberation - a touchstone for the animal liberation movement - simply argues for consistency of
treatment of sensible creatures. We can experiment on animals if we would also perform that same
experiment on young children, or brain damaged adults.2 To avoid speciesism we ought to be
equally comfortable performing medical experiments on animals and comparable members of the
human population.
This sits uneasily with people who think that animals ought not to be sacrificed for the greater
good. These people might best be characterized as thinking that animals have rights. Rights, as the
familiar story goes, are largely inviolable, and generally impervious to considerations of the greater
good.3 Whatever the deficiencies of this account, however, it is clear that utilitarianism is the front-
runner among traditional efforts to afford animals moral consideration. Singer notes that “Popular
magazine writers have given it [Animal Liberation] the tag line ‘the bible of the animal liberation
movement.’”4
The answer to the question of how best to ground these inviolable rights of animals confounds those
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who search for it. An appeal to intuitionism amounts to ending the debate before it starts, and
justification demands much more than this. Kantian alternatives seem unlikely to succeed. Kant’s
ultimate emphasis on the autonomy of moral agents seems to inevitably exclude the rest of the
animal kingdom, given our current views about autonomy and the cognitive limits of non-human
animals.
Although not much has been said in favor of the possibility of a contractarian grounding of the
moral status of animals, it is our contention that this is a mistake. Notwithstanding that classic and
contemporary contractarians largely suppose that their theory cannot grant moral agency to animals,
this paper will argue that it can. Contractarianism is capable of affording animals direct moral
status. Contractarianism is at least as promising an avenue as utilitarianism, and is far more
promising than Kantianism. The traditional pessimism regarding contract theory’s prospects in this
regard stems from an inadequate attention to the fact that the idea of a moral ‘contract’ is a
metaphor. Taking the contract metaphor too literally leads one to require that a moral agent must
possess the ability to make a contract. This would leave much of the animal kingdom out. But this
inference is based on a mistake; contractarians ought to care (roughly) about the ability of an animal
to change its behavior in the face of activity by other purposeful agents. This allows that animals
may be moral agents. In what follows we will first make clear the failings of Kantian analyses
before proceeding to explain how the moral status of animals can be grounded on a contractarian
analysis.
II. Kantianism
Kant’s own words on the issue seem to indicate the limit of Kantian analysis of this problem: a duty
to not treat animals cruelly is at best an indirect duty, deriving from the tendency of animal cruelty
to lead to cruel treatment of rational beings.5 To say that this is an unsatisfying justification is
perhaps being too kind. As it has been pointed out, if it turns out that treating animals cruelly is
cathartic, leading to people treating others better, then Kant would be committed to the claim that
animal cruelty was mandatory.6 The justification of animal rights seems to require something more
than an indirect duty to treat animals well. Animals must be shown to be due moral consideration
in and of themselves.
Contemporary modifications of the Kantian program have also been unsuccessful. Allen Wood, for
example, has suggested that we might vindicate a moral duty towards animals by respecting
rationality per se, instead of individual embodiments. He suggests that such a reinterpretation allows
for our acknowledgement of duties to animals insofar as they possess the necessary conditions, or
potential, for autonomy.7 Christine Korsgaard argues that rational agents must necessarily value
their own animal nature, and so must, on pain of inconsistency, view animals as worthy of moral
respect.8 James Skidmore has persuasively argued that such tactics are inadequate. Both Wood and
Korsgaard go on to argue that, given the unconditional worth of autonomy, that which is
constitutive of autonomy ought thus be afforded unconditional worth. However, Skidmore argues
that “[g]iven that we must value our autonomy as an end, it does not follow that we must value in
ourselves the conditions that make it possible.” 9 One need not claim intrinsic value for animal
natures any more than one need claim intrinsic value for matter, which is itself a constitutive
element of our animal natures.
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J. Baird Callicott offers a different kind of Kantian argument, one that suggests that properly
understanding what intrinsic value amounts to will allow animals (and nature more broadly) moral
consideration.10 Shifting from the mysterious ‘intrinsic value as an objective property’ usually
attributed to Kant, Callicott suggests that, as there is no value without an evaluator, we ought to
understand intrinsic value as relative to an individual subject, and as contrasted with instrumental
value. An individual values things either as ends in themselves (intrinsically), or because they are
efficient means to other (intrinsic or instrumental) ends. Those things that are intrinsically valued
are treated differently than those things that are instrumentally valued when we evaluate resource
use. “Broad recognition of … intrinsic value … places the burden of proof on those who would
over-ride that value for the sake of realizing instrumental values.”11 In contrast “[i]f something has
only instrumental value, its disposition goes to the highest bidder.”12 Animals that are valued
intrinsically, therefore, are afforded special (but not absolute) consideration.
This approach is faced with three significant problems. In the first place, animals are still only
afforded moral status indirectly on this account. Secondly, treating all intrinsically valued objects in
this way has a significantly counter-intuitive result: anything that is “broadly” intrinsically valued
will be afforded this special consideration. There are those among us for whom the beauty of an
urban skyline holds intrinsic value. And some animals have intrinsic disutility for some people: a
phobia regarding spiders, to take a common example, easily translates into intrinsically valuing the
state of affairs in which spiders cease to be. Given high urban populations, and an innate fear of
wilderness, animals may not benefit from human adoption of such a framework. But more to the
point, if someone values destruction intrinsically, then this value too would be afforded the same
special consideration as an animal that is intrinsically valued. As would all of the above mentioned
values. We suppose that for many this result will be a reductio ad absurdum of Callicott’s proposal.
Finally, there is no explanation from Callicott as to why something that is intrinsically valued is,
therefore, to be treated differently. Worse, no reasonable answer seems forthcoming. One can only
appeal to one of two things in order to explain why that which is intrinsically valued ought to be
afforded special consideration: that it is valued, or that this value is intrinsic. That it is valued will
not explain the difference, as the intrinsically valued shares this with the instrumentally valued.
That it is valuable not as a means to another end, but simply in and of itself, will not explain the
difference unless intrinsically valued objects are supposed non-fungible. This echoes Kant’s
assertion that what is valuable in itself must not be treated merely as a means, that the intrinsically
valuable must not be treated as if it has a price. But this explanation is not available to anyone
who, together with Callicott, suggests that value is subjective. One can trade away an intrinsically
valued good for an instrumentally desired good with perfect consistency. Whenever we stop staring
at the horizon, which is valued for its own sake, and return to work which is only instrumentally
valuable, we make exactly this kind of decision. Intrinsic value, subjectively understood, has no
necessary lexical priority over instrumental value. The degrees of intrinsic and instrumental value an
object might possess are of a type, both relative to an individual’s valuation. There is no reason to
suppose that the former ought to be treated differently from the latter.
The core elements of a Kantian grounding of moral worth are the identification of that which has no
price as a rational (autonomous) will, together with the claim that that which has no price cannot be
treated as if it did have a price. Identifying value relative to a subject’s valuing implies that it does
have a price, and so cannot explain why that valued thing ought to be treated any differently than
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any other commodity. Allowing that a thing has no price if it is an end in itself makes it plausible
that at most autonomous wills will be afforded such status. It does not follow from this that things
constitutive of autonomy will also be afforded such status. Given this, there is no good reason to
expect success when Kantians attempt to justify animals’ moral worth.
III. Orthodox Contractarianism
Hobbsean style contractarians have, for the most part, been silent on the issue of animal rights.
Based on the common interpretation of contract theory, this is entirely understandable.
Contractarians typically appeal to the metaphor of a contract, agreed to by each individual moral
agent, in which it is outlined what must, may, or must not be done to each other agent, and to that
which they hold dear. Only if a moral code could be agreed to by each relevant agent, in spite of
the available alternative codes, is that code deemed justified. It seems clear, if this metaphor is
adequate, that to be a moral agent one must be able to contract with another. But, it might plausibly
be thought, animals cannot contract, and so cannot be moral agents. Thus animals cannot be
afforded moral importance in and of themselves. This certainly has been the orthodox view since
Hobbes: “to make covenant with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because not understanding our speech,
they understand not, nor accept of any translation of Right; nor can translate any Right to another:
and without mutuall acceptation, there is no Covenant.”13 As it has been put by Jan Narveson in
one of the few contemporary efforts to explore a contractarian justification of animal rights,
“animals cannot generally make agreements with us anyway, even if we wanted to have them do so.
… when animals refrain from killing other animals or people just for the fun of it, there is no good
reason to think that they do so out of moral principle. … On the whole, therefore, it seems clear
that contractarianism leaves animals out of it, so far as rights are concerned.”14 Animals, on the
whole, lack the cognitive capacities taken to be necessary to enter into contract. Narveson adds to
the classical contractarian program a concern that moral agents need to be able to act in certain
ways because they respect a moral principle. This Kantian intuition does not sit well with the
contractarian project, as we shall see.
The widespread acceptance that contractarianism cannot account for the moral status of animals has
led animal rights theorists to pursue alternative justifications for morality. This seems premature. It
does seem that Utilitarianism and Kantianism both have significant hurdles to jump before they can
be said to adequately ground the notion of animal rights. The dismissal of Contractarianism,
however, rests on a mistaken interpretation of the theory. Inadequate attention is paid to the fact that
contractarianism makes use of a metaphor. The language of contract is simply used as a heuristic to
highlight the belief that subjective value is the ultimate underpinning of morality: a justified moral
system must be one that affords each adherent more of what they value than if each did not so
adhere, if we suppose that morality is to be internally motivating. Suggesting that animals cannot
contract, and so cannot be moral agents on a contractarian account, takes the metaphor much too
seriously, as shall be explained below.
IV. Indirect Moral Status
The failure to afford moral consideration to animals is not typically taken to be the most serious
deficiency of contractarianism. Contractarians have been more embarrassed by their failure to afford
moral consideration to the non-productive members of human society. Contractarianism has tied
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morality to mutual advantage in an effort to bind the demands of morality with motivation to act. In
doing so, it has been assumed that a rough equality of ability must hold between contractors for the
mutual advantage of cooperation to be assured. Insofar as equality of capabilities does not hold, it
is maintained, the superior may find it more efficient to dominate the inferior to get what they want.
David Gauthier puts the case well when he suggests that “Among beings with unequal power, it
may be that one party may benefit most by coercing the other, and on our theory would have no
reason to restrain.”15 Any being might be excluded from moral consideration due to its having less
power at its disposal than a given person. Putting aside the equality condition for the moment, there
remains the issue of productive capacities. To put the issue bluntly, there are people who have few
or no productive capacities. The congenitally handicapped and children are the most obvious, and
oft-cited, examples.16 Tying morality to mutual advantage seems to exclude those lacking
productive capacities. Any moral theory which fails to afford consideration to children and the
congenitally handicapped is hardly worthy of its name. Children evidence both lesser capacities
than adults and are, in a sense, non-productive members of society.17 We might excuse
contractarians their lack of exploration of the issue of animal rights, in the face of this much more
general and pressing consideration. It is worth taking some time exploring what has been most
plausibly said on the issue of the moral status of non-productive members of human society in this
wider context, and the implications for the issue of the moral status of other animals.
Christopher Morris points to a way in which children, the handicapped, and animals may be said to
have moral standing on a contractarian account. “To have moral standing is to be owed moral
consideration,” according to Morris.18 Non-productive members of a population cannot have
primary moral standing on a contractarian account, because to have primary moral standing one
must at least have powers roughly equal to others and be attractive to others as a party to the
contract (as a cooperator). Children, the severely handicapped, and animals thus fail to be attractive
potential cooperators as they have nothing to offer us that cannot be more efficiently taken by
coercive means. This does not exhaust the possible ways in which one may come to have moral
standing, however. A child, for example, may come to have secondary moral standing if a parent,
who has primary moral standing, cares sufficiently about that child to not cooperate without that
child also being afforded moral standing. Should this be the case, then that child will be included as
someone to whom justice is due; otherwise society would not benefit from the parent’s cooperative
efforts. Non-productive members of society can thus come to have some kind of moral standing on
a rational choice contractarian model.
The terms primary moral standing and secondary moral standing are unfortunately chosen, as they
lead to an understandable misunderstanding of Morris’ position.19 This is not an account which
implies a two-tiered moral system. It is not the case that this understanding of contractarianism
affords animals, the handicapped, and children less protection than other members of society. Each
agent which has moral standing, in either sense, is understood to be afforded the same privileges
and rights as other agents.20 Still troubling, however, is that a being with secondary moral standing
has that standing contingently. It is only because some agent with direct moral standing cares about
this other agent that moral standing is offered. This also leaves open the possibility that some
agents will still be left outside of the scope of a contractarian morality. Any agent who fails to be
sufficiently valued by at least one agent with direct moral standing will still not be due moral
consideration. While it may seem implausible in the case of children that they will not be of
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sufficient value to someone to have secondary moral standing, it becomes more plausible to suggest
this of some animals, given the species bias evident in the world today. It seems even more likely
that some animals will not get even this secondary moral standing when we make clear what the
test is to determine if such standing is due: someone with primary moral standing must care
sufficiently much about this agent to forego the benefits of cooperative society if this agent is not
afforded moral standing. Simply caring about the agent in question is not enough. It may be
reasonably expected that this leaves many animals beyond the pale of morality, even if it is unlikely
to leave out many children. Some may also be troubled by the contingency of this moral standing.
It is only because of the fact that some other agent cares about each animal in question (or perhaps
class of animals?) that they are afforded moral standing. Given this contingency and the likelihood
that some agents will nevertheless not be afforded moral standing, more must be done before a
satisfactory contractarian account of animal rights can be presented.
Before proceeding to develop an account of animal rights that makes clear that they have primary,
or direct, moral standing, a few words regarding an overlooked implication of suggesting that
animals have secondary, or indirect, moral standing are in order. One of the implications of viewing
animals as having indirect moral standing is that they cannot forfeit that moral standing. On the
standard contractarian account, any moral agent who breaks the moral rules has as much as said that
they are not willing to abide by the terms of the contract anymore, and are acting however they
wish. This in turn releases everyone else from acting morally towards that renegade. The renegade
has forfeited his claim against others that he not be treated in certain ways. However animals, when
thought of as being afforded only indirect moral standing, cannot instigate such a loss of status by
withdrawing their support of the contract. They are due moral consideration because of someone
else’s support of the contract. This provides us a method through which to suggest, for example,
that a deer should not be shot for eating cultivated carrots. Noting that many agents will have both
primary and secondary moral status, this might also help us to explain why we have rules detailing
what may not be done even to renegades such as convicted or suspected criminals. They have
forfeited their primary moral standing, but cannot forfeit their secondary moral standing. These
agents are still owed moral consideration.
V. Direct Moral Status
We next argue that a good contractarian case can be made for direct, or primary, moral status for
animals. This should be pleasing both to supporters of animal rights, who otherwise are at a loss for
an adequate theoretical grounding for their view, and to contract theorists, who otherwise have to
concede that the implications of their theory fail, in a serious way, to square with the moral
intuitions that most of us have about at least some animals.
We should be frank, from the beginning, and note that we do not pretend to provide, in this paper,
a contractarian argument that guarantees that most, or even many, animals would receive significant
moral consideration, much less a contractarian argument that would support anything like a robust
regime of rights for all animals. What we do claim to provide, however, is a prima facie
contractarian argument for the basic moral considerability of (at least some) animals. That is, we
claim to show that animals – unlike plants and unlike rocks – are the kinds of things that make
suitable candidates for moral consideration. This opens the door to a range of arguments that might
seek to establish more concrete general or specific moral claims, whether arguments for the moral
considerability of specific animals, or arguments for a particular degree of moral considerability
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(e.g., having rights, constituting side-constraints on utility maximization, or as possessors of
morally significant utility functions) for some or all animals. However, we will suggest below that
the argument put forth here may well more readily sustain a regime of rights than does, for
example, utilitarianism.
V1. The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
This argument is based upon a functionalist understanding of moral agency. For contractarians,
moral agency is isomorphic with capacity for being party to a contract. But as we noted above,
many take the metaphor of a contract too literally. That there is a contract, in the sense required by
contractarian arguments, only requires (roughly) that each party to the contract modify its behaviour
in a way that enhances the utility of at least some other parties to the contract, and that each party
to the contract benefit by being a party. We suggest that in order to be parties to a “contract” in this
sense, entities must have roughly the following characteristics.
The first characteristic is potency. Entities must be capable of a range of actions that affect the
utility of other agents differentially. The second characteristic is vulnerability. They must be
capable of having their utility differentially affected by the actions of other (potential) parties to the
contract. The final necessary characteristic is responsiveness. Agents must be responsive to the
behaviour of others. That is, they must be capable of modifying their behaviour in response to
stimuli or adapting it to new environments.
These three characteristics are necessary in order for an agent to be eligible as a “contractor,” in the
contractarian sense. And more importantly, (on the contractarian account) these three characteristics
are jointly sufficient, assuming there exists a plurality of such agents, to make it reasonable
(rational, in the sense of maximizing long-term utility) for those agents to modify their behaviour in
response to each other’s needs. That is, they make it reasonable to engage in a “contract.”
Contractarians have been wrong to suppose that what is required is a specific range of cognitive
capacities, or some minimum threshold level of cognitive ability. Other agents should not care – it
is not rational for them to care – what goes on inside another agent’s head, so long as they have
reason to believe that the other agent’s behaviour can be reliably predicted or, if need be, modified.
Why are those three characteristics necessary for contractarian moral agency? We look at each in
turn. Potency is a requirement because an agent must be able – must have the power – to do at least
some things that affect others in material ways. If an entity is not potent in this sense, then others
have nothing to fear or gain from them, and thus have no need to engage in “contracts” with them.
If others are indifferent to its actions, or indeed its existence, then an entity cannot be part of a
contract. As Hume has commented, if there were creatures that could not “make us feel the effects
of their resentment,” we would not “lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them, nor could
they possess any right or property.”21 Vulnerability is a requirement because agents must be capable
of being affected in material ways by the behaviour of others. If an entity is invulnerable, this
means that it will have little motive to modify its own behaviour in ways necessary to make a
“contract” attractive to others. It can afford to be indifferent to the behaviour of others, and has no
need to seek (and pay for) concessions from others. This point is familiar to those familiar with
Plato’s telling of the story of the Ring of Gyges. Finally, agents must be responsive. If an entity is
not responsive to the behaviour of others, then by definition it will not be able to modify its
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behaviour in response to the (suitably modified) behaviour of other parties to the contract.
Why are those three characteristics sufficient? In particular, why not include other – indeed any –
cognitive capacities? The reason is simple. Inclusion in the contract has to do with the profitability
of the relationship between contractors. Variable benefit (cashed out as a combination of mutual
vulnerability and potency) is what makes it rational to ‘ask’ another to constrain its behaviour –
where that ‘asking’ might be signaled by something as simple as ‘offering’ (or demonstrating one’s
willingness) to do so oneself. ‘Asking’ and ‘offering’ need not be linguistic, or even intentional,
and so require no particular cognitive capacity.
Any entity that is responsive, potent, and vulnerable has all the characteristics one could reasonably
hope for (short of the sort of fellow-feeling ruled out by standard contractarian arguments) in a
potential partner to a contract. So long as an entity is capable of mutually beneficial patterns of
behaviour modification, others ought not to care what, if any, cognitive capacities permit that
capability.
We argue that many animals – including the animals humans typically care most about – may
plausibly be said to meet all three criteria for contractarian agency. So, animals in general are the
type of beings that count, from a contractarian point of view.
V.2 That Animals Have These Capacities
How do animals meet the criteria? In this section, we seek to demonstrate that animals (at least core
cases) have the three characteristics required for the sort of agency required for moral
considerability within a contractarian framework. (As noted above, we seek only to establish a
prima facie case, and leave it to others to offer detailed arguments for or against the inclusion of
particular animals in the category of agents capable of engaging in ‘contracts’ in the relevant sense.)
Here is a trio of what we take to be core cases. The cases are progressively challenging ones, ones
for which it is progressively harder to see the sense in which animals are capable of engaging in a
‘contract’ with us. So, we will look at both “easy” and “hard” cases. We think that looking at this
range of cases is crucial. “Easy” cases are of practical importance because they include the category
of animals – namely house-pets – with which most of us interact most frequently. And we need to
look at what seem to be hard cases if we are to avoid begging crucial questions by focusing only
on those animals for which our common sympathies, awareness of animal sociability, and our
patterns of intimate interaction make it all too easy to make a claim for moral considerability.
First, consider house-pets. This first category of animals is one already accorded a significant
degree of consideration. But do they have the characteristics of a contractarian moral agent? The
fact that pets are potent, in the sense of being capable of differentially affecting our utility, is clear.
They can affect us by biting, scratching, and by peeing on rugs; on the upside, they can bring us
companionship, affection, and positive aesthetic experiences. (Note too that pets can also do harm
to third parties; the fact that our pets are capable of harming others – whether by biting or by
digging up rose gardens – means that our pets can affect us indirectly by bringing upon us the wrath
of our neighbours and, in serious cases, the coercive power of the state.) The fact that house-pets
are vulnerable in the relevant sense is equally clear. Indeed, house-pets that never go outdoors are
almost totally dependent upon us for their survival and well-being. They rely on us to feed them
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(given that they are essentially trapped in our homes), and to refrain from abusing them. The
existence of humane societies is surely testimony to the vulnerability of animals kept as pets. Of all
animals, house-pets are also the ones most easily seen as responsive. They can be trained; they
respond to voice commands (though, alas, not unfailingly). Almost by definition, a house pet is an
animal capable of modifying its behaviour to within a range that makes them suitable companions
for thin-skinned beings such as humans. Of course, having a house-pet is not utterly risk-free (see
our discussion of their potency, above), but a house-pet is sufficiently capable of constraining its
behaviour so that the risks of having it in our home are well within the range of risks normally
accepted readily in other domains.
Next, let us consider the case of a wild, social animal: the wolf. The potency criterion is all too easy
to make for wild animals of any sort; our fear of their potency is nearly universal. Almost all wild
animals have defensive or offensive weaponry of one sort or another, whether teeth, claws, or
spines. Wolves, in particular, are fierce predators that often prey upon animals our size, making use
of a combination of a fearsome set of teeth, significant speed, and the ability to engage in
coordinated hunting. Wolves, however, are also clearly vulnerable. Wild animals, including wolves,
can be (and often are) trapped, hunted, and deprived of habitat by humans. Indeed, wolves have
been driven to the point of extinction in many areas. Finally, wolves are clearly responsive. They
can expand or contract their territory to seek or avoid human contact. They are capable of being
“trained,” through reward or punishment. Wolves, for example, may be “encouraged” to alter their
territory by the human introduction of livestock. They can also be successfully discouraged, by
means of a number of strategies, from pursing livestock.22 They are thus capable of (being
convinced to) alter their behaviour in such a way as to render them acceptable neighbours.
Finally, let us examine the case of a wild, asocial animal, such as a venomous snake. Venomous
snakes are clearly potent in the relevant sense: indeed, they are paradigmatically dangerous animals.
It is estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 people worldwide die of venomous snakebites each
year.23 Yet snakes are also clearly vulnerable to humans. Despite the fierce reputation enjoyed by
many snakes, they are nonetheless physically vulnerable to human weapons and to human vehicles.
Like so many other wild animals, they can also be adversely affected by human encroachment upon
their habitat.24 Finally, snakes are responsive. Snakes are capable of learning; in particular, there is
evidence that they can be conditioned to respond differentially to different prey.25 This clearly
suggests that they are not incorrigible.
If each of these three categories of animals – from those readily recognized as sociable, to those for
whom we have the least natural sympathy and with which we are least likely to socialize – can be
seen to have the three characteristics necessary for agency in the thin, contractarian sense, then we
have reason to regard them as beings capable of engaging in ‘contracts,’ and thus worthy of being
accorded intrinsic moral status.
It is important to note that, technically, our final requirement of “responsiveness” needs to be
qualified; what is actually required on the part of agents is a certain degree of responsiveness, or
rather responsiveness across a suitable range of behaviours. In order to be parties to a “contract,”
entities must have, within their behavioural repertoire, a set of behaviours that are sufficiently
benign as to render it plausible that, in order to bring about that behaviour, other agents would be
willing to forgo the anticipated benefits of warfare. Entities that are responsive only in the sense of
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/tucker.html[9/18/2009 5:10:11 PM]
being able to shift from one set of behaviours, the net impact of which upon our own utility levels
is negative, to another set of behaviours, the net impact of which is similarly negative, are not
“responsive” in the relevant sense.
This ‘suitable-responsiveness’ might alternatively be cast as a stipulation of what must be true about
the world, or about the characteristics of two parties to a contract described relationally. For
contract to be possible, two things must be true. First, agents must be capable of benefiting each
other in ways that couldn’t be better had by coercion. (Indeed, there are presumably some valued
ends that cannot be achieved coercively at all. Consider, for example, such commonly desired
experiences as the love of a pet, or the wonder of seeing a wild animal in its natural habitat.) And
secondly, things must be such that we’re better off contracting with them than removing them from
our experience (much less killing them).
Thus vulnerability and potency might best be thought of as relational characteristics. So our claim
is that, given the kind of beings we humans are, the characteristics of animals are such that they
constitute suitable contracting partners for us.
VI. Benefits and Differences of our View
We are now able to compare and contrast a contractarian account of the moral status of animals
with that of utilitarianism. Contractarianism potentially affords moral status to each animal that is
vulnerable, potent, and responsive. This status depends on two states of affairs: that the animal has
a range of possible behaviours that include some that give us more value than that animal’s removal
from our experience, and that this benefit cannot be efficiently obtained through coercion.
Utilitarianism, by contrast, grounds moral status in the capacity to feel pain or pleasure. Animals
can demonstrably be said to feel pain or pleasure, and so are afforded moral consideration. When
considering what one ought to do, an agent must consider the ways in which each possible action
gives animals pleasure, or brings them pain. It is important to note that it is not, strictly speaking,
the animal’s ability to feel pleasure and pain which is relevant to utilitarians, but that fact combined
with our ability to differentially affect an animal in this regard. This forestalls the inevitable
objection to contractarianism that it affords animals moral standing due to contingent facts about the
world, or about other agents. Contractarianism is no guiltier of this than utilitarianism. We offer as
a benefit of adopting a contractarian justification of the moral consideration of animals that if
contractarians who claim that contractarianism results in a system of rights are correct, then turning
to contract theory would give those animals who do meet the conditions outlined above moral
rights. The same benefit is not thought to follow so straightforwardly from utilitarianism.
Utilitarians can only offer moral considerability, not rights.
A further virtue of our view is that it does not depend upon speculative animal psychology. No
controversial claims are made here for the ability of animals to experience emotions, to be self-
aware, or to have a conception of themselves as continuing subjects of experience. Given the
notorious difficulty of the problem of other minds, views that depend upon assessing cognitive
capacity prior to assigning moral considerability either to categories of agents or to specific
individuals render the moral considerability of animals controversial, to say the least. By focusing
on functional capacities, rather than internal cognitive processes, our view renders such debates
otiose.
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VII. Issues Remaining
We conclude that we have now provided a substantial, if prima facie, defense of the idea that
animals as a group are indeed the sorts of agents worthy of moral consideration under a
contractarian framework. We believe this to be an innovative claim. Not surprisingly, our
exploration of this claim leaves a number of questions for later investigation. We next sketch a
handful of the more significant of these unanswered questions.
Among the three characteristics required for contractarian agency was the characteristic we called
“responsiveness.” But as noted above, that single word masks a considerable degree of variation.
What degree of responsiveness is required of agents, either theoretically or in the world as it is?
How should that degree be expressed, and how should it be determined?
Does the sort of moral status that results from the point of view we’ve advocated imply epistemic
advantages over the indirect moral status implied by Morris’s viewpoint? Morris’s account implies
that an entity’s moral status depends upon the contingent fact that some third party, herself the
subject of direct moral status, cares about the entity in question. This means, in practice, that we
cannot know the moral status of a given entity, if that entity is of a type not normally capable of
being party to a contract, unless we know whether this particular entity is in fact cared about by
some agent with direct moral standing. It seems to us that our own view avoids this problem.
However, our account may escape this worry only to become subject to another, namely the
problem of ‘first contact.’ On an account such as ours, how ought humans to constrain their
behaviour when dealing with animals whose ability to meet our criteria for moral consideration is
not known?
The implications of affording animals direct moral standing has been left unexamined. It remains to
be seen if the results of this inclusion are as desirable as might be expected at first blush. As noted
above, Morris’ indirect moral status has the implication that an agent who is afforded it cannot
relinquish it. If an agent is afforded indirect moral standing, it is due to the preferences of another
agent, and contingent on that other agent’s behavior. Arguing for the direct moral standing of
animals might have the implication that each animal can relinquish its moral standing. The animal
might, to put it another way, be said to deserve differential treatment due to its actions. It will sit
less well with some than with others that an animal may be said to be due punishment for an action
that comes naturally to it. Whether this affording of direct moral standing to animals does have the
implication that animals can relinquish their moral standing, and further whether this is a result to
be applauded or decried, are both important questions that need to be examined.
A final unanswered question involves whether the net benefit to be had from ‘contracting’ with
animals (or with particular animals, or animals of particular species) exceed the net benefit of not
doing so. In order for a contractarian argument to get off the ground in a particular case, some sort
of cooperative surplus needs to be available. It remains to be seen whether such cases can be made,
either as a generalization about animals or as a specific claim about particular animals or particular
populations of animals.
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